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Abstract
Background: Cash transfers are key interventions in the World Health Organisation’s post-2015 global TB policy.
However, evidence guiding TB-specific cash transfer implementation is limited. We designed, implemented and
refined a novel TB-specific socioeconomic intervention that included cash transfers, which aimed to support TB
prevention and cure in resource-constrained shantytowns in Lima, Peru for: the Community Randomized Evaluation
of a Socioeconomic Intervention to Prevent TB (CRESIPT) project.
Methods: Newly-diagnosed TB patients from study-site healthposts were eligible to receive the intervention
consisting of economic and social support. Economic support was provided to patient households through
cash transfers on meeting the following conditions: screening for TB in household contacts and MDR TB in patients;
adhering to TB treatment and chemoprophylaxis; and engaging with CRESIPT social support (household visits and
community meetings).
To evaluate project acceptability, quantitative and qualitative feedback was collected using a mixed-methods approach
during formative activities. Formative activities included consultations, focus group discussions and questionnaires
conducted with the project team, project participants, civil society and stakeholders.
Results: Over 7 months, 135 randomly-selected patients and their 647 household contacts were recruited from 32
impoverished shantytown communities. Of 1299 potential cash transfers, 964 (74 %) were achieved, 259 (19 %) were
not achieved, and 76 (7 %) were yet to be achieved. Of those achieved, 885/964 (92 %) were achieved optimally and
79/964 (8 %) sub-optimally.
Key project successes were identified during 135 formative activities and included: strong multi-sectorial collaboration;
generation of new evidence for TB-specific cash transfer; and the project being perceived as patient-centred and
empowering.
Challenges included: participant confidence being eroded through cash transfer delays, hidden account-charges and
stigma; access to the initial bank-provider being limited; and conditions requiring participation of all TB-affected
household members (e.g. community meetings) being hard to achieve.
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Refinements were made to improve project acceptability and future impact: the initial bank-provider was changed;
conditional and unconditional cash transfers were combined; cash transfer sums were increased to a locally-appropriate,
evidence-based amount; and cash transfer size varied according to patient household size to maximally reduce mitigation
of TB-related costs and be more responsive to household needs.
Conclusions: A novel TB-specific socioeconomic intervention including conditional cash transfers has been designed,
implemented, refined and is ready for impact assessment, including by the CRESIPT project. The lessons learnt during
this research will inform policy-makers and decision-makers for future implementation of related interventions.
Background
Tuberculosis kills 5000 people per day [1], mostly in
resource-constrained settings. TB has long been recog-
nised as an illness inextricably linked with social
deprivation and marginalisation [2, 3]. Poverty predis-
poses individuals to TB [4, 5] and hidden costs associ-
ated with even free TB treatment can be catastrophic:
exacerbating poverty [6], leading to adverse TB treat-
ment outcome, increasing TB transmission and poten-
tially worsening TB control [7]. Nevertheless, the global
model for TB prevention, management and research has
been principally focused on biomedical rather than
socioeconomic approaches [8, 9]. There is a pressing
need to expand the traditional TB control paradigm
based on case finding and treatment in order to embrace
more holistic approaches that encompass the wellbeing
of people and households living with TB and communi-
ties affected by TB [10–15]. This vision has been
formally acknowledged in the World Health Organisa-
tion’s (WHO) post-2015 global End TB Strategy [16]
which, for the first time in the modern era of TB
control, explicitly identifies poverty reduction strategies,
including universal health coverage and social protec-
tion, as key pillars of the future global response to TB
[16, 17].
Social protection consists of policies and programs
designed to reduce poverty and vulnerability by improving
people’s capacity to manage social and/or economic risks
[18], and includes health insurance, food assistance, travel
vouchers and cash transfers [19]. Cash transfers generally
provide economic support to impoverished people with
the aim of moving them out of extreme poverty and
vulnerability whilst improving human capital [20–25].
Cash transfers are already used to modulate behaviour in
HIV/AIDS [26, 27] and improve maternal health [28].
Mitigating poverty-related TB risk factors of TB-affected
households using cash transfers may be a cost-effective
investment from a societal perspective [29] because it may
support TB treatment, improve TB prevention and cure,
and potentially enhance TB control [30]. However, there is
little operational evidence to guide implementation or
evaluate the impact of TB-related socioeconomic support
including cash transfer interventions [15, 19–21, 31–40].
For over a decade, our research group (www.ifhad.org)
has worked with TB-affected households in the shantytowns
of Callao, Peru. From 2007 to 2011, we conducted an as-
sessment of Innovative Socioeconomic Interventions
Against TB (ISIAT) [39]. The interventions had two dimen-
sions: i) education, community mobilization and psycho-
social support to increase uptake of TB care; and ii) food
transfers, microcredit, microenterprise and vocational
training to reduce poverty. This intervention increased pre-
ventive chemotherapy in household contacts and HIV test-
ing and TB treatment completion in TB patients [39].
Building on the lessons learnt during the ISIAT project,
we designed a larger 6-year research project called CRE-
SIPT: a “Community Randomized Evaluation of a Socio-
economic Intervention to Prevent TB” to test for impact
on TB control. This paper aims to describe the challenges
of implementation, lessons learnt and refinement of this
complex socioeconomic intervention to control TB. The
paper focuses on set up of a TB-specific cash transfer
scheme, and thus aims to provide research groups, NGOs,
civil-society representatives, policy-makers, stake-holders
and the wider TB community with an interim guidance
document concerning the operational logistics of TB-
adapted socioeconomic interventions involving cash trans-
fers in resource-constrained settings.
Methods
Intervention objectives
The CRESIPT project aims to evaluate a socioeconomic
intervention to support prevention and cure of TB in
TB-affected households and, ultimately, improve com-
munity TB control. The CRESIPT socioeconomic inter-
vention was developed over 7 months in two contiguous
suburbs of Peru’s capital, Lima: Ventanilla, 15 peri-urban
shantytown communities in which our research group
has been recruiting patients to an on-going cohort study
for over a decade; [39] and Callao, an area including 17
impoverished urban communities.
Intervention planning
The CRESIPT project was informed by our previous re-
search [39], extensive expert consultation [19], and a
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systematic review [20] of cash transfer interventions
published in 2011.
We built upon an a priori conceptual framework
reflecting the postulated pathways through which the
intervention could lead to improved TB control in the
study site (Fig. 1). The intervention outputs related to
shared CRESIPT project and Peruvian National TB pro-
gram goals: i. screening for TB in household contacts
and MDR-TB in TB patients; ii. adhering to TB treat-
ment and chemoprophylaxis; and iii. engaging with CRE-
SIPT social support activities. Thus, our intervention
targeted defined outcomes along the TB causal pathway.
In TB patients, we aimed to improve early diagnosis and
treatment, provide support to increase adherence to and
completion of treatment, and achieve sustained cured.
Amongst household contacts living with these TB
patients, we aimed to prevent TB.
The previous systematic review of cash transfer inter-
ventions was updated in 2014: Medline, Embase, Global
Health and HMIC databases were searched from 1st
January 2011 onwards using the term “Tuberculosis/
economics” [Mesh] OR “Tuberculosis, pulmonary/
economics” [Mesh] OR “Tuberculosis/prevention
and control”[Mesh] AND “Economic support” OR
“Cash transfers”. This search found only one random-
ized controlled evaluation of economic support to
improve tuberculosis treatment outcomes [41]. Other
necessary and informative literature on economic inter-
ventions did not meet inclusion criteria for this system-
atic review because it either related specifically to HIV/
AIDS (such as the IMAGE study) [42] or was limited by
having no control group or impact assessment [17, 43].
A consultation process was undertaken to inform the
project and its scope: a total of 135 formative activities were
conducted including multi-sectorial meetings, focus group
discussion (FGDs), semi-structured interviews, evidence re-
views and other expert consultations (Table 1 and Fig. 2).
Table 2 summarises the critical review of the available
evidence that occurred during the planning process, and
the manner in which this review subsequently informed
the main operational design and implementation deci-
sions relating to some of the main aspects of the cash
transfer intervention, including: existing cash transfer
schemes, conditionality and transfer size.
Thus the planning process involving previous re-
search, extensive expert consultation and systematic
reviews of cash transfer interventions led to the de-
sign of a novel socioeconomic intervention that aimed
to be locally-appropriate, feasible and sustainable and
consisted of:
 economic support: conditional cash transfers to
reduce TB vulnerability, incentivise and enable
care; and
 social support: household visits and participatory
community meetings for information, mutual
support, stigma reduction and empowerment.
The participatory community meetings, which are
reported separately, consisted of an interactive educational
workshop concerning issues surrounding TB and house-
hold finances, and a “TB Club” in which participants
shared TB-related and other experiences in a support
group format specifically adapted to the local setting.
Fig. 1 Conceptual framework of the conditional cash transfer scheme within the CRESIPT project
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Acceptability
To characterise operational challenges and the participants’
perspectives, we performed an acceptability assessment
using a mixed-methods approach. This involved the collec-
tion of quantitative and qualitative data from participants, a
civil society group of ex-patient community representatives,
CRESIPT project staff and local and regional Peruvian TB
Program staff and co-ordinators.
Ethical approval
Approval was granted by the ethics committees of the
Callao Ministry of Health, Peru; Asociación Benéfica
PRISMA, Peru; and Imperial College London, UK. All
interviewed participants gave written informed consent
to participate in the study and for subsequent publica-
tion of anonymised data.
Sample size
The main outcome of this preliminary work of the
CRESIPT study (reported elsewhere) was completion of
TB chemoprophylaxis in household contacts of TB pa-
tients. TB patients had an average of five contacts and
25 % of those eligible for TB chemoprophylaxis com-
pleted it [39]. Therefore, a priori, we calculated that
312 patients would give 80 % statistical power to detect
a 33 % increase in the primary outcome comparing
Table 1 CRESIPT consultation process
Formative
activities
Attendees Number
performed
Number of
participantsa
Notes/details
A. Analysis of
evidence
CRESIPT project research team and
international collaborators from Imperial
College London, London School of
Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, and
John Hopkins School of Public Health
3 28 Analysis and publication of ISIAT project results in
2011 [39] WHO-commissioned systematic review
of conditional cash transfer schemes’ impact on
TB control in 2011 [20] plus updated review in 2014
B. Expert
consultation
Peruvian National TB program chiefs 10 8 Steering meetings with regional and national TB
Program coordinators
JUNTOS (www.juntos.gob.pe)
(Peruvian conditional cash transfer program)b
1 5 Discussed logistics and minimal impact evaluation
of conditional cash transfers for health and education
to female heads of rural households [5]
WHO Stop-TB partnership 3 5 Ongoing meetings and site visits
World Bank 2 3 Ongoing meetings with senior World Bank economists
especially relating to cost-effectiveness considerations
C. Symposia and
conferences
International multi-sectoral researchers
(including World and Pan-American
Health Organisation members)
3 30 “Social protection interventions for TB control”, UK,
2012 [19] WHO led policy consultation on social
protection for TB in Brazil, 2013 [16] TB Union World
Lung Health conference in France, 2013
D. Focus Group
Discussions (FGDs)
CRESIPT multidisciplinary team 9 10 www.ifhad.org FGDs with the CRESIPT field team
research personnel
Ex-TB patient civil society
“LUPORFAT”
4 13 Registered “Junta Directiva” (board of directors) of
ex-TB patient community representatives “Lucha
Por Familias Afectadas Por TBC” www.prisma.org
Structured interviews and FGDsKey NGO Stakeholders 4 5
CRESIPT project participants 19 20 Including participatory community meetings and
training of facilitators
Peruvian National TB program
health post staff
18 12 Multi-disciplinary teams: co-ordinators, doctors,
nurses and technicians
Banks 6 5 Account executives and social inclusion department
representatives
E. Field team
meetings
CRESIPT multidisciplinary team 34 11 Covered operational field logistics and acceptance
of the intervention
F. Steering
committee
CRESIPT multidisciplinary team &
international Collaborators
19 6 Twice monthly committee review of published literature
(including systematic review) and discussion of financial,
methodological and statistical design issues and potential
intervention improvements
TOTAL NA 135 NA NA
While JUNTOS may be TB-inclusive (i.e. some TB patients will receive incentives as they are below this poverty threshold), it is neither TB-sensitive nor
TB-specific [20]
FGD focus group discussion
amean average
bWe were unable to integrate our urban TB-specific intervention with JUNTOS’ existing rural cash transfer scheme
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intervention versus control households with two-sided
5 % significance. The 312 patients recruited were ran-
domly assigned in a 1:1 ratio to the intervention arm
(normal standard of care from the National TB Pro-
gram plus socioeconomic intervention) and control
arm (normal standard of care from the National TB
Program).
Results: designing and implementing the
intervention
Designing the conditional cash transfers
Targeting
To provide evidence to assist national TB programs
considering implementing TB-related socioeconomic
interventions, our intervention exclusively targeted
TB-affected households (i.e. was “TB-specific”) rather
than targeting all households living below the poverty
line. The reasons for this decision were: encouraging
results from the TB-specific ISIAT project; [39] the
urgent need for impact assessment and operational
evidence for TB-specific socioeconomic interventions;
the lack of existing TB-specific or TB-sensitive socio-
economic initiatives with which to feasibly collaborate
in Peru; and the achievability of focusing on relatively
small numbers of TB patients versus much larger, op-
erationally unmanageable numbers of people at risk
of TB in the wider community [52]. In addition, it
was expected that by working exclusively with TB-
affected families we would generate evidence concern-
ing those sections of the community most at risk of
TB.
Cash delivery strategy
Cash transfers directly into bank accounts were selected
as the most locally-appropriate way to deliver economic
support because in the impoverished shantytown com-
munities of the study site there were many: local bank
agencies; food or material vouchers had poor accessibil-
ity and acceptability; direct cash transfers posed a secur-
ity risk; and transfers using mobile-phone technology
potentially overlooked the most vulnerable patients [53]
and were prone to handset loss/theft, damage, or faults.
Cash transfer size
Deciding on the size and duration of cash transfers was
difficult because this has varied considerably in past pro-
jects [47, 49]. Learning from similar regional projects
[45, 49], our local catastrophic costs findings [7], and
ongoing liaison and site visits from key policy-makers
from WHO, Pan-American Health Organisation and the
World Bank, we aimed to completely mitigate TB-
related direct out-of-pocket expenses, which was ex-
pected to be equivalent to 10 % of median TB-affected
household annual income in the study site [7]. This
Fig. 2 Flow diagram of CRESIPT project activities during planning, implementation and refinement of the social protection intervention
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Table 2 Available evidence and CRESIPT project operational decisions relating to cash transfers
The available evidence - what do we know? Operational decisions for implementation of the CRESIPT project intervention
Cash transfer
schemes
• Cash transfer schemes were implemented in Latin America in the 1990s to tackle
the socioeconomic consequences of financial crises [21]. Schemes include: Bolsa
Familia (Brasil, 1995); Oportunidades (Mexico, 1997); Red de Protección Social
(Nicaragua, 2000–2005); Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH Ecuador, 2004); Red
Solidaria (El Salvador, 2005); and JUNTOS (Peru, 2005)
• We investigated the use of food or other vouchers/cards but found very few
existing systems in the study site. Those that were in place could only be redeemed
in supermarkets (felt in FGDs to be inappropriate for the study population due to
infrequent use, limited access and higher costs of goods)
• Our systematic review revealed only one controlled trial of TB-specific cash transfers from
South Africa that showed no significant increase in successful TB treatment outcome [41].
During treatment, vouchers (15 US Dollars) that could be exchanged for foodstuffs were
given to patients by local health post nursing staff. The authors opted for vouchers over
cash due to: posing a lower security risk; not being able to be spent on unhealthy items
such as alcohol or cigarettes; being easy to monitor; and “public health sector clinics
would not have bank accounts, making electronic transfers difficult” [41]
• Based on our experiences and the limited published evidence, we opted for a bank
cash transfer scheme. Bank transfers reduce the likelihood of fraud, robbery or
security risk (a concern in impoverished shantytowns in Lima, Peru) [37, 41] and are a
reliable way to maintain accurate transfer records for cost-effectiveness analysis. We
also felt opening a bank account and having freedom of choice to decide on how
transfers were spent was empowering [44]
• We decided not to impose conditions on how the cash transfers were spent.
Successfully funded social protection interventions related to TB (especially MDR TB)
have mainly focused on mitigating non-medical direct costs associated with having
TB such as food or travel [17, 44]. There is some evidence that even when money
rather than food vouchers is given as a form of social protection, it is commonly
spent on food and travel costs anyway [45]
Conditionality
of cash transfers
• Cash transfers can be unconditional, conditional (requiring specific behavioural, education
or health actions) or combined [46, 47]
• Perú has an exemplary, well-established and organised National TB program.
Learning from ongoing collaboration with regional heads of the TB program, we
decided that our cash transfers conditions would relate to National TB Program
treatment and prevention goals and selected project activities
• Unconditional cash transfer schemes include: Ecuador’s BDH targeting those below
poverty threshold or by location; [48, 49] and a village bank loan scheme for TB-affected
households in Cambodia [50]
• We chose to use conditional cash transfers that mixed both hard and soft
conditions to be more inclusive: “hard” in that if participants met the condition
with “perfect behaviour” then a double cash transfer was provided and “soft” in
that if participants met the condition with adequate behaviour, then a simple cash
transfer incentive was provided (Fig. 4a and b)• Conditions can be “hard” (if the condition is not met, the transfer is not made) or “soft”
(less stringent conditions where transfers may be made even when a condition is unmet).
Soft conditionality may be preferable in settings with poor healthcare infrastructure
[21, 46, 51]
How much
cash to give
• Minimal evidence exists on the size of cash transfers. In Latin America, total amounts have
varied widely in previous projects: 6-10% of annual income in Ecuador; [49] 21.8% in Mexico;
and 29.3% in Nicaragua [47]
• We aimed to establish an amount for the cash transfers that was too small to act
as a perverse incentive [34, 35], but large enough so that poverty-related TB risk
factors in TB-affected households were reduced and the households were both
incentivized and enabled to achieve National TB program and project goals
When to give
cash
• Most initiatives deal more with poverty than a finite illness such as TB, so evidence of
duration and frequency of TB-specific cash transfers is scarce. Longer duration and more
frequent cash transfers may have greater impact in TB-affected households [31]
• We decided to provide the majority of the cash transfer incentives in the intensive
treatment phase (the first 2 months of treatment) and to continue monthly cash
transfers specific for treatment adherence throughout treatment. This meant the
intervention was designed to increase equity for people with TB-HIV co-infection
and MDR TB whose treatment lasted longer than 6 months
• Our previous work in the study setting showed that hidden TB costs were mainly
incurred pre-diagnosis or early in treatment [7]
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amount was: empirically believed to be too small to act
as a perverse incentive; [34, 35] affordable for a TB
program in a low income country (expert opinion sug-
gests that a socioeconomic intervention that adds less
than 50 % to the cost of biomedical treatment but re-
duces TB risk by 30–40 % would be likely to justify pol-
icy change and widespread implementation); [54, 55]
large enough so that poverty-related TB risk factors in
TB-affected households may be reduced; and that incen-
tivized and enabled TB-affected households to achieve
the shared goals of the Peruvian National TB Program
and CRESIPT project.
Cash transfer timing
We designed the intervention so that cash transfers would
be provided throughout treatment but weighted towards
the first 2 months, when TB-affected households incur
the majority of hidden costs (Additional file 1: Figure S1a
and b) [7, 56, 57].
Cash transfer conditions, levels and responsiveness
We stratified cash transfer incentives into “double” and
“simple” incentives. Double incentives were made for
meeting the condition “optimally” (i.e. monthly adherence
missing less than two daily tablets). Simple incentives were
made for meeting a condition “acceptably” (i.e. monthly
adherence in which two or more tablets had been missed
but the patient had not abandoned treatment). Figure 3
summarizes seven different potential scenarios of TB pa-
tients and the total amount of cash transfer incentives
they would receive. Were a participant with non-MDR
TB to receive all the double incentives available
throughout treatment, they would receive a total of 230
US Dollars; for all simple incentives, they would receive
a total of 115 US dollars (Additional file 1: Figure S1a
Fig. 3 Cash transfer received by participants in seven different potential scenarios during intervention implementation. Note: Typically in Peru,
treatment of TB in people with non-MDR TB has a duration of 6 months, in people with HIV-TB co-infection treatment lasts 9 months, and in
people with MDR TB treatment lasts 24 months. Key: ✓ = condition optimally achieved and double incentive cash transfer provided; X = condition
not achieved thus no incentive cash transfer given/paid
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and b). In situations in which TB treatment routinely
extended beyond 6 months, such as HIV-TB co-
infection (9 months) or multi-drug resistant (MDR) TB
(18 to 24 months), cash transfers continued throughout
the duration of treatment. The decision to stratify sim-
ple and double incentives was taken in order to encour-
age a positive feedback loop of behaviour change
through graded incentives whilst increasing the oppor-
tunity for vulnerable patient groups to receive cash
transfers even when they could not achieve conditions
optimally.
Implementation of the conditional cash transfers
Banks
Of 10 banks visited, formal meetings were organised
with four that aimed to: create a relationship with the
bank to achieve sustainable cash transfers throughout
the study; identify charge-free appropriate accounts;
create a “virtual” way of opening accounts to minimize
paperwork, time spent “in branch” and travel-related
patient costs; establish a mutually suitable day on which
to accompany patients to open accounts; and to clarify
the bank’s accessibility in our study sites (i.e. branches
and agencies).
The banks we consulted raised similar concerns about
the proposed intervention, including: infection risk; cash
transfer flow; and difficulties opening accounts with pa-
tients who have no national identification, fixed abode,
or are illiterate. We initially chose one bank that ap-
peared to be more likely to overcome these issues be-
cause it had a social inclusion department with previous
involvement in successful microfinance initiatives.
Opening bank accounts
Recruited patients with a negative sputum smear micros-
copy test (indicating low infectiousness) were accompanied
by our project staff to open a bank account. The account
holder’s details were then relayed to our project office with
a copy of the bank’s original documents. In the case that
the patient was a minor, did not have legal capacity, wished
for another household member to be the named bank ac-
count holder, or had prolonged sputum smear positivity,
then a household member was selected by the patient or
household to be the named bank account holder. Patient
transport and time costs were reimbursed by our project.
Cash transfer administration
The patient’s incentive card (Additional file 1: Figure S1a
and b) was updated by the field nurses when each condi-
tion was achieved. Confirmation of completion was made
through liaison with the patient, review of CRESIPT pro-
ject records (e.g. participatory community meeting attend-
ance) and Peruvian National TB Program records and
treatment cards (e.g. medication adherence verification).
Signed incentives cards were returned to a project adminis-
trator who double digitized the data. Thus, a weekly list of
patients, their bank account details and required transfers
was generated. The same day, this list was submitted elec-
tronically to a member of the social inclusion department
of the bank, and the virtual transfers made. The transaction
codes and receipts generated were double digitized in the
CRESIPT project database and delivered to the patients in
the health post by the CRESIPT field nurses.
Recruitment
From February to August 2014, we expanded project ac-
tivities from 2 to 32 communities. As per the a priori
sample size calculations and study protocol, 312 con-
secutive TB patients from the study site were invited to
participate of whom 149 were randomized to receive
the socioeconomic intervention. 12/149 (8 %) pa-
tients declined to participate, 2/149 (1 %) died prior
to recruitment, and 2/149 (1 %) were recruited and
subsequently did not complete follow up. Thus, 133/
149 (89 %) were recruited and participated through-
out the study period. The number of patients declin-
ing to participate was higher in urban than in peri-
urban communities (15 % [95 % CI 6–23] versus 5 %
[95 % CI 1–10 %] respectively, p = 0.04). Of the 133
participants, 9/133 (7 %) had MDR TB, 5/133 (4 %)
were HIV positive, and 7/133 (5 %) were diabetic.
Cash transfers achieved up to 1st July 2015
Of 1299 potential cash transfers, 964 (74 %) were
achieved (of these, 885/964 [92 %] were achieved opti-
mally and 79/964 [8 %] sub-optimally), 259 (19 %) were
not achieved, and 76 (7 %) were yet to be achieved.
Thus, 964 conditional cash transfers totalling 61,120
Peruvian Soles (20,373 US dollars) were made to TB-
affected households for meeting the conditional goals of
the Peruvian National TB Program and CRESIPT project
(Fig. 4a and b). The average cash transfer amount re-
ceived by each TB-affected household over the course of
the intervention was $173 USD.
Discussion: lessons learnt and persisting
knowledge gaps
The implementation and acceptability assessment identi-
fied strengths and limitations of our theoretical approach
during the design of CRESIPT. The lessons that emerged
are grouped into successes, challenges and refinements
in Table 3, which aim to inform the design of future
studies and, ultimately, allowed us to identify persisting
knowledge gaps in this field (Table 4).
Successes
This project generated evidence that conditional cash
transfers to TB patients were logistically achievable in
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impoverished shantytown communities of Lima, Peru.
The intervention considerably supplemented small
monthly food baskets given unconditionally to TB pa-
tients by the Peruvian National TB Program.
Through regular steering meetings, focus group discus-
sions and contact in the health posts, strong collaboration
was achieved between our team, banks and the Peruvian
National TB Program:
a
b
Fig. 4 a Proportion of patients optimally achieving (double incentive), adequately achieving (simple incentive) and not yet achieving project
conditions. b Total amount provided to patients by conditional cash transfers in total and for each condition achieved
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Table 3 Successes, challenges and refinements of the cash transfer incentive dimension of the socioeconomic intervention
Successes Challenges Refinements
New
evidence
New experience and evidence was generated that
TB-specific cash transfers for TB-patients were feasible
in this study setting
There was a lack of available evidence and thus clarity
when prioritising the output of the cash transfers in
these TB-affected households. Thus, deciding on the
cash transfer amounts and timing was difficult
Following previous and updated analysis of hidden
costs and income of TB-affected households [7],
cash transfer amounts were increased with the aim
of reducing their poverty-related TB risk factors
Collaboration There was strong multi-sectorial collaboration with Peruvian
National TB Program and bank staff, allowing multiple, virtual
cash transfers to be made and recorded, reducing fraud and
security risks
Account maintenance charges were introduced by
the bank during implementation of the intervention
and delays in cash transfers eroded participants’ trust
in the project
We changed our bank service provider: the new
bank had better accessibility and no charges. We
self-imposed penalties on our project for late cash
transfers (participants gained additional transfers)
Cash
transfers
Cash transfers lasted throughout treatment, increasing
equity for people with TB and HIV co-infection or MDR TB,
whose treatment duration extended beyond 6 months
As a research team, we had limited experience of
cash transfer interventions or working with new
urban study communities
Achieving a balance between operational simplicity
and complex TB-affected household needs was
challenging
Opening a bank account was a first-time experience for
many of the participants and qualitative participant feedback
suggested that this was perceived as an empowering action,
especially for female members of the household who have
previously been shown to be a vulnerable subpopulation in
the study setting [5]
Feedback suggested that patients would prefer
immediate gratification for completion of conditions
rather than delayed cash transfer bank payments
Immediate incentives were provided for attending
participatory community meetings (including food
baskets and high-quality vouchers documenting
the date and amount owed to the participant)
Project conditions requiring all members of the
TB-affected household to participate were
poorly achieved and not equitable due to different
household sizes
We combined conditional and unconditional cash
transfers. Conditions requiring household participation
were altered to be responsive to household size:
incentives given were refined to be given per
household member involved
Inclusiveness
and high risk
groups
The intervention was holistic and household-centred
because, in addition to cash transfers, it provided community
meetings consisting of educational workshops (covering themes
such as TB treatment, transmission, prevention and also financial
themes such as responsible household budgeting in an
interactive manner) and TB Clubs (mutual support aiming to
reduce stigma and increase empowerment, reported separately)
“High risk” patients in more urban communities
were difficult to engage with (especially the
formerly-incarcerated, drug- or alcohol-dependent
and gang members)
Participatory community meetings for patients with
MDR TB were established and increasing social
support was provided to other high risk patients
(including the homeless, drug or alcohol dependent,
those with poor adherence and/or lack of engagement
with our project)
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“The CRESIPT project and Peruvian National TB
Program are complementary and should continue to
support each other in a common goal.” [Peruvian
National TB Program Regional Chief].
Such ongoing collaboration and adaptation to stake-
holder and participant feedback helped the project to be
more locally-appropriate, responsive and patient-centred.
The conditional cash transfers were facilitated by multi-
sectorial collaboration including with the bank’s social
inclusion department. Multiple, regular, simultaneous, vir-
tual cash transfers were achieved through online banking
that generated a digital record, reducing the likelihood of
fraud. Because field team staff were not directly carrying
or giving cash or cash-equivalents (such as cash vouchers
or cheques), cash transfers were a secure method of pro-
viding incentives. The majority of participants did not
have bank accounts [58] and some patients described the
act of opening a bank account as empowering:
“…especially for female patients, who are not normally
the financial decision-makers of the households in
these communities” [CRESIPT Project Nurse
Technician].
The socioeconomic intervention was holistic and
household-centred with the economic dimension of
cash transfers being complemented by social support ac-
tivities including household visits and participatory
community meetings [59]. In addition to TB prevention
and control messages, an educational component was
an important element of the participatory community
meetings, in which participants were involved in educa-
tional activities concerning: managing a household
budget; spending and saving responsibly; and meeting
the conditions for cash transfers. This TB-related and fi-
nancial education was highly rated by participants and
perceived as an ethically sound accompaniment to cash
transfers by CRESIPT project staff and TB-affected
households:
“I understood and learnt more, and saw that I was
not alone” [TB-Affected Household Member];
Table 4 Lessons learnt and persisting research gaps
Lessons learnt Research gaps
Social protection interventions for TB control require
inter-sectorial collaborations
• What are the most effective and cost-effective partnership models for welfare
and TB control bodies?
• What are the best ways to integrate poverty reduction strategies and biomedical
activities for TB control?
TB-specific conditional cash transfers are feasible and
safe, but logistically complex
• What is the role of conditions in achieving the intervention objectives?
• Are conditional, unconditional or combined cash transfers preferable and how does
this depend on the settings in which the cash transfer program is implemented? [62]
• What conditions are too hard to achieve for TB patients despite being well rewarded?
• What is the best way to balance the conditions for the cash transfers in order that
they reflect both the priorities of patients and their households, and the priorities of
researchers and policy makers? [63]
• What is the role of the size and timing of cash transfers on the impact of the
intervention?
• What is the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of different delivery mechanisms?
TB-specific conditional cash transfers can be
challenging to deliver to difficult-to-reach populations
• What are the optimal ways to adapt conditional cash transfer settings targeted at
hard-to-reach populations in challenging urban environments characterised by
violence, drug-addiction and marginalisation?
• Should social protection interventions only be offered to high-risk patients or is it
more cost-efficient to offer them to all patients plus an enhanced intervention to
high-risk patients?
• Is cash without social support sufficient to reach high-risk-patients or is social support
necessary?
Health and financial management education are
necessary and ethically appropriate
• Would cash transfers have the same impact even without an educational component?
• What is the empowering factor of the cash transfers to TB patients: 1) receiving
cash; or 2) being acknowledged and seen as individuals with rights and needs?
• What is the aspect of the social protection intervention most likely to impact on TB
prevention and cure: a) the economic dimension of cash transfers; b) the social
dimension of home visits and community meetings; or c) both?
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“The meetings generated good solidarity and
camaraderie” [TB-Affected Household Member].
Our experience is consistent with reports that finan-
cial incentives should be complemented by education
or “social marketing” if health objectives are to be
achieved. Further research is needed to investigate the
relative importance of health and financial education
on the impact of cash transfer interventions aiming to
improve health.
Challenges and refinements
The lack of published evidence of similar studies was
particularly challenging for the implementation of TB-
specific cash transfer incentives in resource-constrained
communities.
Cash transfer targeting
The significantly higher number of patients declining to
participate seen in the urban rather than peri-urban
communities may have been due to the fact that CRE-
SIPT project activities were new in this area or reflect
distinctions between these communities:
“We don’t fully understand the demographic
differences and challenges between the urban and
peri-urban communities” [CRESIPT Project
Investigator]
The field staff reported that some patients were not
willing to participate because: i) they thought that
CRESIPT project staff were part of a governmental
body; ii) they did not want to register their true ad-
dress with either the TB program, a bank, or the
CRESIPT project in order to keep “under the radar”
[CRESIPT Project Nurse] especially those formerly-
incarcerated or involved with “pandillas” (drugs
gangs); iii) they did not wish our team to visit their
home because their household was unaware of their
diagnosis or they frequently moved location; or iv)
the incentives were insufficient to match the money
they lost for participating in project activities and,
more importantly, continuing on their treatment. In
addition, patients with recognised “high-risk” factors
for treatment default such as prolonged treatment
courses (e.g. MDR TB and/or HIV), mental illness,
illegal drug use, homelessness, or being formerly-
incarcerated were difficult to recruit and retain.
Because these patients did not consent to participate
we could not formally characterise their reasons for
declining. This lack of engagement and formal feed-
back is concerning given that such groups may have
benefited most from the intervention.
“Conditions are appropriate but you need to provide
additional support to those people who find it harder
to meet those conditions” [Ex-TB Patient Civil Society
Representative]
“Some patients would never open a bank account
because they don’t want to register their name”
[CRESIPT Project Nurse]
“[A negative aspect of the CRESIPT project
intervention is] giving an economic incentive to a
patient with drug-dependency and for that matter
any other benefit/incentive such as food baskets
(which some of these patients sell to buy drugs)”
[Peruvian National TB Program Nurse]
To combat some of these issues, extra care was taken
during the informed consent process to reassure poten-
tial participants that the CRESIPT project team is a
non-governmental research organisation with no con-
nections to the justice system and that no project activ-
ity, especially household visits, was mandatory. In an
attempt to address the needs of participants with HIV
and/or MDR TB, we explicitly specified that cash trans-
fers for adherence were provided throughout treatment,
regardless of treatment duration. This longevity meant
that TB-affected household support, staff-household re-
lationship and financial benefits of the cash transfers
were refined to be more equitable and responsive to the
ongoing needs of patients with HIV and MDR TB.
Hard-to-reach populations and/or difficult urban set-
tings such as those in which our intervention was im-
plemented, may be characterised by violence, illegal
drug use and severe marginalisation that are also associ-
ated with TB. These populations and those with comor-
bidities (such as diabetes, HIV, or mental illness) and/or
MDR TB may require differential levels of intervention
including prolonged or enhanced conditional cash
transfers and social support. Future studies may investi-
gate the barriers, feasibility and impact of delivering
TB-specific socioeconomic interventions to challenging,
vulnerable groups in such settings.
Cash transfer delivery strategy
We changed bank-provider because the initial bank-
provider: had limited geographical accessibility; pro-
vided inconsistent information “in branch” (resulting
in some patients opening accounts with maintenance
fees); was reported during feedback sessions to have
been stigmatizing towards patients, not due to TB
(the branch staff were unaware of patients’ diagnoses)
but possibly due to other sociocultural factors such as
poverty or appearance; and introduced account main-
tenance charges to previously charge-free accounts.
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“Some patients lost faith in the project due to the
hidden bank charges” [CRESIPT Project Nurse].
The new bank-provider, while not having a specific so-
cial inclusion department, provided improved coverage
and accessibility because of a greater density of agency
micro-branches in local shops that facilitated participant
transactions. While the new bank-provider overcame the
challenges described above, these experiences have led
us to question whether banks are the most appropriate
delivery strategy. Indeed, conditional cash transfer pro-
grams in Sub-Saharan Africa have predominantly used
specified pay points to pay participants in cash rather
than banks which may be less accessible to the poor and
may have user fees [60]. However, banks have been the
favoured partner agent in existing conditional cash
transfer programs in Peru (JUNTOS), Brasil (Bolsa
Familia) and Mexico (Progresa) with the co-ordination
of national cash transfer programs being centralised
through national banks in these countries [60]. This
level of coordination may only be suitable in countries
with comparatively developed financial infrastructure,
information and communications technologies, and ac-
cessibility to bank branches or micro-agencies. We have
reviewed other modalities of conditional cash transfers
in greater detail elsewhere [20]. Future research into im-
plementation of socioeconomic interventions may com-
pare the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of cash
delivery mechanisms including mobile phone vouchers,
mobile banking, automated or other pay points, or in-
novative strategies, for which rigorous evidence is cur-
rently lacking. To achieve optimal impact, implementers
of conditional cash transfer programs may work more
closely with the local communities and civil societies to
establish how a program can be adapted to be appropri-
ate and acceptable in that specific setting.
Cash transfer size
During focus group discussions, the internal research com-
mittee debated what the most important objective of cash
transfers is: mitigating TB-related costs; avoiding cata-
strophic costs; or reducing poverty-related TB risk factors.
This confounded deciding the cash transfer amounts. To
address this challenge, we analysed TB patients’ costs,
which demonstrated that direct out-of-pocket expenditure
was 10 % of that household’s annual income [7]. These re-
sults, together with additional data characterising annual
household income for TB-affected households in the study
site, informed the cash transfer amount necessary to match
direct out-of-pocket expenditure and subsequently avoid
catastrophic costs. The optimal cash transfer size is likely to
depend on the intervention setting and proposed outcomes
of the intervention. This will require baseline evaluation of
local TB-related costs prior to planning for and
implementing cash transfers of suitable amounts. Further
research is required to evaluate how cash transfer size af-
fects intervention impact and cost-effectiveness [61]. It is
noteworthy that the strategy we adopted in this research
was a “costs-mitigation” rather than a “poverty-reduction”
strategy and involved a cash transfer amount that were ap-
propriate and feasible for the local setting. While long-term
poverty reduction would be an appealing additional goal,
this would likely require greater socioeconomic support
than national TB programs could afford.
Cash transfer timing
During focus group discussions, the delay between incen-
tivized behaviour and cash transfers was noted as a barrier
to achieving project conditions due to the lack of a tan-
gible “reward” and accompanying positive reinforcement
loop. For example, when a household attended a participa-
tory community meeting, it could be 1 to 2 weeks before
they received the corresponding cash transfer.
“Patients want immediate and tangible gratification
on the same day as they complete their condition”
[Ex-TB Patient Civil Society Representative].
Cash transfers were initially delayed due to the flow of
information from the field, to the research office, to the
bank. While cash transfer flow improved during the pro-
ject, patients and households stated that such delays
made household budgeting difficult:
“Due to the initial cash transfer delays, some patients
didn’t get the money when they most needed it”
[CRESIPT Project Nurse].
Consequently, we increased the speed of the cash transfers
and plan to instigate a system during CRESIPT in which on
the same day that a household attends a community meet-
ing, they receive a small high-protein food basket and a
high-quality certificate-like voucher detailing the amount
and date by which the cash transfer would be made.
Participants reported that they would prefer to receive
cash transfers at the beginning of the month for their
adherence in the subsequent month rather than wait
until the end of the month. As has been reported in
other settings [45], the waiting was perceived as finan-
cially stressful and, on occasion, demoralising. Learning
from this setting-specific qualitative feedback, in the
planned CRESIPT study in these same communities, we
will combine unconditional monthly cash transfer provided
to all TB patients taking treatment with supplementary
conditional cash transfers for meeting CRESIPT project
and National TB Program conditions. Furthermore, we
have self-imposed penalties on our project if incentives do
not reach the patient’s bank account within 1 week of
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confirmation that the condition has been met. Specifically,
if a delay occurs, their cash transfer is doubled.
Cash transfer conditions, levels and responsiveness
Project conditions requiring involvement of “100 %” of the
TB-affected household in order to receive the cash trans-
fer (e.g. attendance at participatory community meetings)
were hard to achieve. In addition, the amount of these
cash transfers was fixed and independent of household
size (see Fig. 3) and thus felt to be inequitable because lar-
ger households received a lower cash transfer amount per
household member. There was, therefore, a perceived
challenge in balancing operational simplicity (e.g. fixed-
amount incentives) while responding to patient household
needs (e.g. variable incentive depending on household
size). Consequently, on the basis of this qualitative evalu-
ation of the implementation process, we suggest designing
relevant incentives to be more equitable and responsive to
household size: a fixed amount added to the patient’s cash
transfer for each member of their household on comple-
tion of the condition. In this way, larger households will
receive the same amount per household member as
smaller households.
Conclusions
A novel TB-specific socioeconomic intervention was: de-
signed through multi-sectoral collaboration coupled with
evidence from a systematic review; refined to meet patient
and household needs during implementation through com-
munity participation, engagement and acceptability feed-
back; and proved to be feasible in an impoverished,
challenging environment. The intervention is now ready for
impact assessment, including by the CRESIPT project. Fur-
ther lessons from CRESIPT will aim to assist TB control
programs to effectively implement the recent global policy
change of including socioeconomic support as part of TB
control activities.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Figure S1a. Details of the operational conditions to
meet in order to receive double incentives. b: Details of the operational
conditions to meet in order to receive simple incentives. (ZIP 492 kb)
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
TW, DB, MT, DH, RM, JL and CAE conceived, designed and refined the study.
TW, RM and MT performed data collection and field work in co-ordination with
the CRESIPT team (see acknowledgements). TW, MT and CAE analysed the data.
TW, DB, MT, DH, RM, JL and CAE all contributed to the writing of the
manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Acknowledgements
The CRESIPT project was funded by the Wellcome Trust, IFHAD and the Joint
Global Health Trials Consortium of the Wellcome Trust, UK Medical Research
Council and the Department for International Development (DFID, UK-AID)
and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. TW was also supported by the
British Infection Association with a research project primer grant. CAE was
partially supported by Imperial College Biomedical Research Centre.
The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis,
decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
The authors are grateful to the TB-affected families of Ventanilla and Callao
for their participation in the project and invaluable feedback.
The authors are grateful to the IFHAD team for their endless hard work and
contributions in the field and laboratory.
Key messages
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settings, we designed, implemented and refined a novel TB-specific
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